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Abstract
The 2009 pandemic of H1N1 influenza, compounded with seasonal influenza, posed a global challenge. Despite
the announcement of post-pandemic period on 10 August 2010 by theWHO, H1N1 (2009) virus would continue to
circulate as a seasonal virus for some years and national health authorities should remain vigilant due to unpredict-
able behaviour of the virus. Majority of the world population is living in countries with inadequate resources to
purchase vaccines and stockpile antiviral drugs. Basic hygienic measures such as wearing face masks and the
hygienic practice of hand washing could reduce the spread of the respiratory viruses. However, the imminent issue
is translating these measures into day-to-day practice. The experience from Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) in Hong Kong has shown that general practitioners (GPs) were willing to discharge their duties despite risks
of getting infected themselves. SARS event has highlighted the inadequate interface between primary and second-
ary care and valuable health care resources were thus inappropriately matched to community needs.
There are various ways for GPs to contribute in combating the influenza pandemic. They are prompt in detecting
and monitoring epidemics and mini-epidemics of viral illnesses in the community. They can empower and raise
the health literacy of the community such as advocating personal hygiene and other precautious measures. GPs
could also assist in the development of protocols for primary care management of patients with flu-like illnesses
and conduct clinical audits on the standards of preventive and treatment measures. GPs with adequate liaison with
public health agencies would facilitate early diagnosis of patients with influenza.
In this article, we summarise the primary care actions for phases 4-6 of the pandemic. We shall discuss the novel
roles of GPs as alternative source of health care for patients who would otherwise be cared for in the secondary
care level. The health care system would thus remain sustainable during the public health crisis.
Background
The outbreak of Novel Influenza A (H1N1) has caused a
global challenge since the first case was identified on 23
April 2009. Within nine weeks, all six WHO regions of
the world were affected [1]. The impact of this pan-
demic is compounded by the ageing population in many
countries and the new epidemics of “non-communicable
diseases” [2]. More than 399,000 laboratory-confirmed
cases from 192 countries were identified by 16 October
2009 [1]. Although WHO announced the post-pandemic
period on 10 August 2010, H1N1 (2009) virus would
continue to circulate as a seasonal virus for some years
and national health authorities should remain vigilant
during the immediate post pandemic period due to
unpredictable behaviour of the virus (WHO Pandemic
H1N1 2009 briefing note 23).
A semi-quantitative study in Australia reported that
additional daily presentations to general practice sur-
geries would be 20-200 presentations per day [3]. One
of us (AL) serving in public primary care setting had to
r e - o r g a n i s es o m ed e s i g n a t e d clinics in the catchment
area to manage patients with influenza-like illnesses.
However, such venture induced an increase in workload
demand of other clinics for chronic illnesses, subse-
quently leading to double burden of diseases. Another
author (AC) working in a private primary care setting in
the community experienced around 50% increase in
workload demand for influenza-like presentations. If a
new outbreak occurs, increase in patient load will be
inevitable. Should the presentations, risks of complica-
tions, and the infectivity of the new influenza pandemic
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should we build up the spare capacity to prepare for
and respond to the pandemic if it arises again?
Discussion
Our capability of responding to the pandemic
Most countries have contingency planning. The Royal
College of General Practitioners in the UK, for example,
has issued clear guidelines for the management and con-
trol of pandemic influenza [4]. However, the less devel-
oped countries are experiencing difficulties in putting
these guidelines in operation owing to inadequate stock-
piles of antiviral drugs to go beyond rapid containment
in supporting the mitigation efforts [5]. For the South-
East Asian countries, the hospital bed capacity and med-
ical personnel might not have the capacity to care for
sudden surges of large number of patients [6]. During
the early phase of the pandemic in May 2009, concerns
of the delay in launching of the UK National Flu Line
were raised in an article published in the British Medi-
cal Journal. The Line acted as the main route for the
public to get advice and access to antiviral treatment
[7]. Widespread community transmission of an infec-
tious disease could overwhelm our health care system
globally. Close collaboration with functional components
of public health such as home-based care and primary
health care is therefore indispensable [1].
Absenteeism amongst health care workers could pose
another threat to the health care system with the pro-
longed periods of a pandemic. A US-based survey
found that nearly half of the health care workers might
fail to report for duties during an influenza pandemic,
particularly the technical and supporting staff [8].
Another study reported that 28% of German health
care workers might remain absent from work in order
to protect themselves [9]. Results from UK study on
randomly selected healthcare workers suggest that
absenteeism could be as high as 85% at any point dur-
ing a pandemic [10]. It has been estimated that a Gen-
eral Practitioner (GP) might expect to see 50 new
cases per week for an average list size, which would
rise to 100 at the height of the pandemic if 30% of
other GPs were sick [11]. However, these studies were
done prior to the H1N1 pandemic, and the data ana-
lyses were based on an H5N1 situation which might
not be valid to be extrapolated for the H1N1 pandemic
[12,13].
An UK study on how GPs responded to an influenza
pandemic revealed that at least one-quarter of the
respondents would respond poorly to such a pandemic
[14]. Non-urban GPs were less prepared to an influenza
pandemic as compared to urban GPs and also less likely
to be aware of pandemic preparedness plans.
How would primary care physicians help?
An article authored by Jennings et al outlined the multi-
strategic approach to pandemic preparedness which
would be categorised as non-pharmaceutical (public
health) and pharmaceutical measures [15]. The former
is aimed to reduce the social impacts such as social dis-
tancing by prompt case isolation, household quarantine,
and closure of school and workplaces. Responce of
health services with increasing number of possible flu
cases and the existing care of other patients, risk com-
munication, data collection and surveillance, and basic
respiratory hygiene practices are all important public
health measures. The pharmaceutical measures included
vaccination, anti-viral medications, stockpiling of vac-
cines and drugs and co-ordinated effort in distribution.
This would involve pre-pandemic vaccination and treat-
ment of cases for secondary prevention.
Although vaccination for H1N1 is now available, it
does not entail overall willingness to accept. A study in
Hong Kong amongst 2,255 health care workers showed
that the overall willingness to accept pre-pandemic
H5N1 vaccine was only 28.4% during a WHO influenza
pandemic alert phase 3 [16]. No significant change in
the level of willingness to accept vaccine was observed
despite an escalation to alert phase 5 [16]. Public health
measures would be more effective with close collabora-
tion between public health authorities and GPs.
GPs in UK were generally praised on their dedication
and efforts during the pandemic [17]. Most of the influ-
enza cases were diagnosed clinically by GPs, not virolo-
gically in the laboratories [18]. The Royal College of
General Practitioners closely liaised with health authori-
ties and external agencies in the battle against H1N1
influenza [17]. Daily updates were sent to their College
Members, and formal guidelines were in place specifi-
cally for GPs in England [19] and Scotland [20]. More-
over, GPs had access to a dedicated email address
flu@rcgp.org.uk for enquiries and support.
Fundamental preventive measures: GPs as health
educators and reassurance of well subjects
Preventive interventions are more effective in primary
care setting which are not related to any one disease or
organ system [21]. Effective primary care integrates ver-
tical care concerning the management of specific dis-
eases from primary to tertiary care as well as horizontal
care with emphasis on addressing the needs of indivi-
duals, families and the community [22]. This is particu-
larly important for preparing and responding to a
pandemic of influenza. Although routine long term
implementation of some physical measures to interrupt
or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses could be dif-
ficult, a systematic review showed that simple and
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the spread of respiratory viruses [23]. Good infection
control (comprising policies and procedures to prevent
or minimise the risk of transmission) is a well known
cornerstone of disease management and should be the
focus of general practice management of respiratory
outbreaks [24]. GPs should be in excellent position to
self-demonstrate as well as educating patients on the
pertinence and efficacies of hygienic measures. The
imminent issue now is how to translate these basic per-
sonal hygienic measures into day-to-day practice.
GPs possess unique skills to empower patients, and
patients felt that they are better helped and more under-
stood by GPs [22]. GPs are in excellent positions to
translate national guidelines into public health educatio-
nand put the daily lives of patients into context. They
could also help to improve the health literacy of the
community on infection control.
GPs in Hong Kong played this role during SARS. The
Hong Kong Medical Association established Doctors’
Network amongst GPs in different districts to support
the local communities [25]. If GPs could play the role of
health educators on preventive controls and the reinfor-
cement of personal hygiene and other precautious mea-
s u r e si nt h ec o m m u n i t ya n ds e r v ea sr e l i a b l er e s o u r c e
persons to share and disseminate information to the
community, the well subjects would thus be reassured.
Their important role of GPs providing psycho-social
support to the community during health crises is
unique.
The management of patients with influenza and
continuous care of other patients
GPs are prompt in detecting and reporting epidemics
and mini-epidemics of viral illnesses [26,27]. The epide-
miological data obtained in primary care represents the
best proxy measurements of the day-by-day prevalence
of ailments in the community.
GPs can also assist in the development of protocols for
primary care management of patients with flu-like illnesses
in accordance to national guidelines to avoid missing cases
while at the same time preventing panics in the commu-
nity. A study conducted in Hong Kong revealed that GPs
were amongst the first group of doctors performing clini-
cal audits in their practice in order to improve the struc-
tures, processes, and outcomes of their services [28]. GPs
could play the frontier role in management of patients
with influenza without complications to allow unexpect-
edly large numbers of ill patients to be managed in the
community. GPs could support the continuity of health
care provision by acting as alternate source of health care
for those patients who would otherwise attend specialist
outpatient clinics, accident and emergency departments
[29], or be hospitalised. Moreover, GPs are trained as
generalists, so they can manage a diverse range of health
problems. In some countries fully trained GPs are capable
of providing counselling to patients, their families, and
alerted members in the community.
Pharmaceutical measures for pandemic control - the role
of GPs
Pharmaceutical measures for pandemic preparedness
include the provision of vaccines particularly during the
pre-pandemic period, and anti-viral drugs for treatment
of cases as well as secondary prevention for selective
cases. Although it was expected that the Australian
Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza
(AHMPPI) would enable frontline Australian GPs to
maintain a central role during the Swine flu pandemic,
their task was rendered extremely difficult owing to
deficiencies in the implementation of AHMPPI [30].
This included resource supply failures, time-consuming
administrative burdens, delays in receiving laboratory
test results and approval for providing oseltamivir to
patients, and a lack of clear communication about policy
changes as the situation progressed [30].
Better consultation with front-line clinicians, particu-
larly GPs, is crucial; and this must occur as a matter of
high priority. Different countries have initiatives for GPs
to play their roles during the flu pandemic [3,30]. Of
specific interest is the “flu champion” in some Austra-
lian practices, which actively advocates educational
activities, promotes vaccinations, and ascertains the
availability of antiviral medications [24]. GPs in the UK
can access influenza vaccines subject to their clinical
discretion during serious periods of the pandemic [31].
No effort was spared to assure that GPs would continue
their services during the pandemic [32].
Collaborative role of GPs with Public Health Authorities:
Learning from SARS experience
The outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong exposed the lack
of support and guidance for GPs and other primary
healthcare professionals during a public health crisis
[33,34]. Despite fear, anxiety and uncertainty, GPs in
Hong Kong demonstrated their willingness and commit-
ments to discharge their duties as healers [34]. A study
showed that 83.2% of GPs aspired deeper involvements
in the war against SARS in the community - as educa-
tors (74.6%), as gatekeepers (68.4%), utilising rapid diag-
nostic tests (68.4%), and administering vaccines when
available (84.2%) [34]. Some GPs expressed their wish to
“share the government’s outpatient burden and/or out-
reach services at elderly homes”, and one doctor had
volunteered to serve in a SARS screening clinic [34].
In terms of public health measures taken by GPs,
more measures were taken by GPs in Hong Kong when
compared to those in Toronto [35]. As the outbreaks
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level in Hong Kong, the sense of vulnerability for possi-
ble infection in GPs should be higher in Hong Kong.
However GPs in private practice voluntarily incurred
negative commercial initiatives such as sharing patient
loads, supplying appropriate protective barriers includ-
ing expensive masks, delivering lectures in school and
community centres, and being medical advisors for
deprived members of the society such as inmates in
elderly homes. Those initiatives would become public
health actions with public health authorities drawing up
the action plans for the GPs.
The SARS experience also revealed that patients were
also unnecessarily referred to secondary care because of
ineffective communications and the unavailability of
some investigations to GPs. Valuable health care
resources were thus inappropriately matched to com-
munity needs [36]. This would put even heavier burdens
on the health care system during the outbreak of
influenza.
If the public health authorities would work more clo-
sely with GPs with more rapid communications in clini-
cal information, epidemiological update and results of
investigations, GPs being the first point of contact for
most patients in the health care system would provide
better, comprehensive and continuing care during the
public health crisis. Studies in Singapore, Australia and
UK all showed the willingness of GPs to provide profes-
sional services during pandemic [10,37]. The findings
were in sharp contrast to the sarcastic remarks by
D a w e si na ne d i t o r i a l“Caring for patient is a moral
imperative during a pandemic influenza outbreak. I
wouldn’t be much of a human being if I closed up and
headed for the hill.”[11].
However the motivation was also altruistic as GPs par-
ticipating in the Australian study did not have stockpiles
of antiviral or personal protective equipments within
their own practices [30]. They also believed that most
appropriate setting to manage these patients was within
GP practices and the government had a duty of care to
stockpile on behalf of the GPs. Public health authorities
would make good use of the public health initiatives
currently in place in order to strengthen the roles of
GPs within the system.
How should GPs prepare for and respond to pandemics?
Reassurance of well subjects, the assessment and man-
agement of patients unwell with influenza, the continu-
ous care of unaffected patients, and the attendance to
the psychological consequences of the disaster were
defined by an Australian study as key roles of GPs dur-
ing pandemic [37]. GPs should provide optimal manage-
ment for patients without flu-like illnesses, empower self
care of patients, and act as alternate sources of health
care for stable patients from secondary care. The ulti-
mate goal is to enable GPs to relieve the workload of
overwhelmed secondary care setting during the flu
pandemic.
The framework for general practice by Nori and Wil-
liam described how to establish an effective level of
infection control for different stages of outbreak [24].
Table 1 summarises the primary care actions for differ-
ent components at the different pandemic phases (4-6)
as defined by WHO [38].
The framework of Table 1 goes beyond infection con-
trol at clinic level. It also covers measures to handle the
suspected cases and close contacts, advice to patients
returning from high risk areas, and the identification of
high risk cases. This framework also enables the primary
care system to play a leading role to sustain the health
care services during the pandemic so that the health
care system can cope with a large influx of patients with
influenza like illnesses without jeopardising the care of
chronic illnesses patients.
Primary health care should be more proactive as an
alternate sources of health care for hospital patients
with stable conditions, developing of protocol for self
management for certain illnesses, acting as resource per-
sons for patient health education in the community and
providing leadership to re-organise the local resources
meeting the local health care needs.
It is highly crucial that such primary care action plan
should be made readily available to GPs not only during
but also before a pandemic. All levels of primary care
professionals from administrators to individual GP sur-
gery professionals and allied health professionals should
be alerted to the existence and elements of these action
plans. When resources including time and manpower
are available, mini-drills could be conducted in surgeries
to investigate the practicalities and logistical barriers of
these actions. We also recommend conducting clinical
audits to assess the structure, processes and outcomes
of these primary care actions.
What should be the next step?
The success of primary care in handling emerging
health crises prompts us to re-conceptualise primary
care as the foundation of care for all people rather than
t h em e r ep r o v i s i o no fb a s i cs e r v i c e sf o rt h el o w e rs t r a t a
of the society [21]. This is particularly important for
developing countries where the delivery of primary care
is usually more fragmented, rendering the entire health
care system more vulnerable to the emergence of an
influenza pandemic.
The roles of GPs should also be broadened to take up
greater share of patient care in the entire health care
system, particularly the co-ordination of triage systems
for suspected cases, disease prevention and health
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munity, alternate sources of care for patients in second-
ary care, surveillance, and close monitoring of suspected
cases and/or close contacts. Clinical audits should be
conducted to assess whether the actions are being
implemented effectively and to identify barriers of
implementing such actions in order to enact remedial
solutions. We are convinced that implementation of the
Table 1 Roles of general practitioners in preparing for and responding to pandemics
Phase 4 Phase 5 - 6
Running and Co-
ordination
Co-ordination of triage system for suspected cases. Liaison with national/local health authority for
prioritisation of primary health care during pandemic.
Standardisation of procedures in handling suspected cases and
cautious cases.
Chair of GP network participates and gives advice in
national/sub-national crisis committee.
Action plan to avoid cross infection of suspected cases and other
patients.
Co-ordination of care at primary care level for large
influx of influenza patients and patients with other
illness.
Co-ordination of other sectors to care for large number of ill patients. Provide local leadership in rational use of multi-sectoral
resources in meeting the local health needs and
demand.
Identify the vulnerable and at risk groups for necessary health
protection.
Care for those under medical surveillance.
Co-ordination of care for close contacts and family members of
suspected or cautious cases.
Protocol for home management for those with minor
illnesses
Situation
monitoring and
Assessment
Collect specimens from suspected cases for rapid diagnosis. Cases reporting
Collect more clinical and epidemiological data from suspected cases. Assess the capacity to manage larger number of ill
patients.
Monitoring of symptoms and signs of flu - like illness of close
contacts.
Monitoring of caution cases.
Close monitoring of ‘suspected’ or ‘cautious’ cases. Assess the uptake and impact of mitigation measures at
community level.
Monitor resources in primary health care to meet the
surge of demands as alternative health care for hospital
setting in management of non-infectious diseases.
Phase 4 Phase 5 - 6
Reducing the
spread of disease
Clinical management of those fever cases or suspected cases
according to national guidelines to avoid cross infection
Re-designation of clinics within the local catchment
area to designated clinics for management of fever
cases and those with flu-like illness, and other clinics to
manage illness of non-infectious nature
Working closely with local health authority for management of those
suspected cases isolated at home and their households and close
contacts
Home visits for patients with chronic illnesses rather
than coming to clinics by those primary care doctors
not involved in management of flu cases
Health protection for at risk groups including clinic staff Special review clinics for those requiring follow up for
chronic illnesses to avoid cross infection
Re-organisation of clinic schedule to minimise cross infection with
minimal disruption of usual services
Prophylactic treatment for high risk groups
To reinforce the community implementation of individual/household
and societal level of disease control measures
34
Given advice and provision of care to patients returning from high
risk areas or close contact of suspected cases in accordance to
national guidelines
Continuity of
Health Care and
Provision
To activate the system in primary health care to manage flu-like
illnesses as well as non-infectious illnesses with minimum chance of
cross-infection
Primary care clinics as alternate source of medical care
for those stabilised hospital patients with ‘non-
communicable diseases’ to relieve the workload of
hospital setting
Self management protocol for patients with minor illnesses Provide psycho-social support to patients, communities
and also health care workers
Communication Explain to local community what is known and not known about the
virus, the state of outbreak, the effective preventive measures and
next steps
Act as resource persons for community to have update
information of transmission pattern, clinical severity,
treatment and prophylaxis options
Act as resource persons for enquire how to obtain medicines,
essential services
Feedback of community concerns to national authority
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situation for the community as well as all levels of the
medical and healthcare systems on a global perspective.
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